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I.

The Status Quo Is Unacceptable

Our current Clean Air Act (CAA)1 will cut national
emissions of the most dangerous and widespread pollutants roughly in half. The U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) estimates that these cuts will prevent 20,000
premature deaths per year and add one full year to the life
of the average American 30-year old. The Agency also estimates that CAA benefits total two trillion dollars per year
and exceed their costs by 30 to one. CAA environmental benefits exceed costs, even if we do not count health
improvement at all.2
If these estimates are true, further pollution reductions
would almost certainly have proportionate benefits. Cutting pollution to one-quarter (rather than one-half) of its
original levels could prevent an additional 10,000 premature deaths and produce a further trillion dollars in annual
benefits. The technologies needed to do this are already
available, and a benefit-to-cost ratio of 30 to 1 leaves a
lot of room for additional control requirements that are
cost-effective.
These estimates may seem too dramatic to be true, particularly since they so strongly support the programs of the
Agency that sponsored them. But they have been used to
support regulations, and have thus survived both public
comment and White House review during the last three
presidential Administrations-Obama, Bush II, and Clinton. More fundamentally, their conclusions are so strong
that they could contain a lot of overstatement and still provide compelling support for CAA reform.
Authors' Note: 7he authors worked together on the Breaking the
Logjam Project from whose recommendations portions of this
Article are adapted. For those recommendations, see the project's

website (http://www.breakingthelogam.org/) or David Schoenbrod,
RichardB. Stewart & KatrinaM. Wyman, Breaking the Logjam:
Environmental Protection T[hat Will Work ch. 4 (2010).
1.
2.

42U.S.C.§§7401-7671q,ELRSTAT.CAA§§101-618.
Figures taken from U.S. EPA, THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF THE CLEAN AIR
AcT FROM 1990 To 2020 (Mar. 2011), available athttp://www.epa.gov/air/
sect812/feb1 1/summaryreport.pdf.
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The current CAA cannot provide those benefits. Congressional action will be needed. Moreover, a new CAA
could decrease the cost of further emission reductions by
allowing sources to achieve them far more efficiently and
effectively than is possible using the accumulated pile of
programs, often based on an outdated understanding of
air pollution, that makes up the current law. A new statute
could cut back or even eliminate many of those programs,
reducing bureaucracy and saving money with no loss of
environmental protection. Reducing the cost of pollution
control would justify controlling pollution more.
Should a new CAA include greenhouse gas (GHG) controls? We favor that inclusion, but our suggestions would
work equally well with or without GHG control.
We explain below that the U.S. Congress designed the
current CAA around two fundamental misunderstandings about air pollution, misunderstandings that make
the statute clumsy and that hinder further attempts at
emissions reductions. We then describe a new approach
that could solve these problems and allow Congress to
dramatically streamline the CAA. We conclude with a
word on GHG control.

II.

Two Misunderstandings About Air
Pollution

A.

The CAA Assumes That All Air Pollutants Have
Clear "Safe" Levels, but They Do Not

The CAA assumes that all widespread pollutants have identifiable "safe" levels. It therefore calls on EPA to set-and
periodically revise-national ambient air quality standards
(NAAQS) at levels that will "protect the public health"
with an "adequate margin of safety."3 It then requires states
to adopt state implementation plans (SIPs) to achieve each
separate NAAQS by a set deadline.' These deadlines are

3.
4.

CAA§109.
SeeCAA§110.
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short and have generally not been met. A missed deadline
generally requires an SIP revision.
Given the absence of scientific knowledge of air pollution in the 1970s, Congress required EPA to revise
NAAQS every five years, and required states to revise their
SIPs whenever EPA revised a NAAQS. The combination of
unrealistic deadlines and NAAQS revisions has generated
an endless stream of SIP changes for regulators to process.
But all recent studies suggest that the damage from
one particular pollutant-fine particulates (PM2. 5)-far
exceeds damage from any other, and that there is no safe
level for PM 2 5 exposure. Adverse health effects (and environmental damage too) occur at all levels studied, though,
of course, they get smaller as levels decrease.' This is also
true, to a lesser extent, of ozone, the other widespread
NAAQS pollutant. The CAA strategy to "control quickly
to a certain level and stop" does not fit such pollutants.
Instead, addressing a pollutant that causes damage at all
exposure levels calls for an ongoing effort to reduce those
levels. It also requires a limiting principle to make sure that
the costs of control do not exceed the benefits.
The current CAA hides the need for such a limiting
principle by instructing EPA to set NAAQS to protect
health without regard to cost or practicality. For pollutants
with no threshold, that means that the Agency must set
the standard on the basis of balance of health, cost, and
other considerations, then cover up the fact that it took
cost or practicality into account. Congress told the public
that NAAQS would put pollution control on the basis of
science rather than politics, but the very nature of the problem makes a decision based on pure science impossible.

B.

The CAA Assumes That Air Pollution Is a Local
Problem, but Often It Is Regional or National

The CAA assumes that high air pollution concentrations
in a state generally come from sources within the state. It
therefore calls on every state containing areas that exceed
any NAAQS to revise its SIP to remove the exceedance.
This makes sense only if in-state emissions generally cause
those exceedances.
The CAA measures to address interstate pollution
occupy a secondary place and have proved hard to use.6
PM2.5 and ozone do not fit this model. High pollution
levels in a state will almost always be caused by emissions
from many other states. Controls in one state alone will
make little difference.

Ill.

ingly inefficient division of authority between state and
federal governments.
Responding to these facts, the William Clinton, George
W. Bush, and Barack Obama Administrations all tried to
fit regional air pollution control programs into the existing CAA. They labored long and ingeniously to develop
a framework to allow the federal government to set up
and run that program. But the courts have almost totally
7
rejected their efforts.
Faced with this failure, EPA has turned to an inefficient
program of source-by-source controls on PM2.5 precursors,
using a statutory framework designed for the completely
different purpose of mercury control.
Legal challenges to that rule are underway. Even if it
survives, the need to fit within the antiquated CAA structures has already made the rule far more complex and far
less efficient than it needs to be.
IV.

Designing a Regional Air Pollution
Control Program

The legislative changes needed to address the pollution
that our current CAA cannot control are tried, efficient,
and effective.
Over 80% of the emissions that give rise to PM2,5 and
ozone and do not come from motor vehicles' come from
about 3,000 of the 50,000 plus "major sources." 9 EPA has
over 20 years of experience with market-based programs
that assign an allowable emissions total to such sources,
reduce that total over time, issue "allowances to emit"
equal to that total, and allow sources to trade the right to
emit among themselves so that the sources that can reduce
emissions most efficiently will make the reductions.
This cap-and-trade approach has repeatedly reduced
emissions more cheaply and more quickly than either
industry or the government had predicted. It minimizes
government interference with business decisions and operates with minimal bureaucracy. EPA's whole acid rain control program, which is designed on these principles, runs
with about 50 employees.1l
A new program should cover all of these approximately
3,000 emissions sources that contribute to PM2.5 and
ozone. To minimize costs, it should ideally be nationwide,
7.

Failed Reform Efforts
8.

These two misunderstandings mean that the current CAA
is largely based on an intricate, awkward, and increas9.

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia (D.C.) Circuit,
which decides CAA cases of national significance, upheld the Clinton-era
program (see State of Michigan v. EPA, 213 E3d 663, 30 ELR 20407 (D.C.
Cir. 2000)), but struck down the George W Bush program (see North Carolina v. EPA, 531 E3d 896 (D.C. Cir. 2008)), and the Obama program
(EME Homer City Generating v. EPA,
E3d
(2012)). The U.S. Supreme Court has agreed to review this decision.
This Article does not recommend any changes in the CAA motor vehicle
control programs. Those standards are already set at very low levels, so that
aggregate motor vehicle emissions will continue to decline as new, tightly
controlled vehicles replace old ones.
DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., BREAKING THE LOGJAM: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

5.

6.

See, in addition to the study cited in fn.2, the preambles to EPA's Clean
Air Interstate Rule, http://www.epa.gov/cair/, and Clean Air Mercury Rule,
http://www.epa.gov/camr/.
See CAA§ 126.
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THAT WILL WORK 90 (2010).

10. Sam Napolitano et al., 7he U.S. Acid Rain Program:Key Insights From the
Design, Operation, and Assessment of a Cap and Trade Program, 20:7 ELECTRICITY J. 47, 55 (Aug./Sept. 2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/airmarkets/resource/docs/US%20Acid%2ORain%2OProgram-Elec%20Journal%20Aug%202007.pdf.

11-2013

NEWS & ANALYSIS

like the highly successful acid rain program, and should
allow nationwide emissions trading.
It should replace the multiple and ever-changing deadlines of current law with a single reduction schedule
gradual enough to avoid excessive reduction costs. One
approach would reduce the number of allowances each
year by enough to keep their price at a set level-for example, $2,000 per ton of sulfur oxides.11 As emissions control
costs declined over time, this constant price would yield
ever-increasing emission reductions.
V.

Eliminating Obsolete Provisions

Assuring continuing nationwide reductions in the most
damaging air pollutants would allow Congress to cut back
or eliminate many other CAA programs. Specifically, Congress could address the following:
" Clean Air Mercury Rule: this rule aims at controlling
mercury emissions from power plants by reducing
their emissions of particulate precursors. But with a
national program to reduce these emissions in place,
the rule would become superfluous.
" SIPs: A national emission reduction program to
reduce emissions would do the job that SIPs are supposed to do, and do it more effectively. If Congress
thought necessary, SIPs could be retained in a simplified form to guard against the possibility that in particular cases the national program might not produce
results quickly enough.
" Prevention of significant deterioration: This program aims at making sure that pollution levels that
are below the NAAQS levels do not increase unduly.
Amending the CAA to assure steady emissions reductions would make that program unnecessary.
" Visibility protection programs: These are separate
programs to control emissions to prevent, and eventually to correct, visibility degradation caused by air
pollution. But a national PM25 and ozone control
program would target pollutants that also degrade
visibility, making a separate program unnecessary.
Any new CAA should retain the fundamental principle
of the NAAQS by requiring EPA to define, by a rigorous scientific process, the health effects of different atmospheric levels of widespread air pollutants. Only in this
way can we understand how well our control efforts are
succeeding. Indeed, these standards could become more
scientific and more informative if they did not have the
immediate and short-term impacts on control programs
that current law provides.

11. This is the level used in EPAs last attempt to establish a regional emissions
control program by regulation.

VI.
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Objections and Qualifications

Such sweeping surgery on a long-established law would
naturally raise objections. We can anticipate and briefly
respond to some of the most important of them here.

A.

Uncapped Pollutants and Sources

Under our suggestion, not all pollutants, and not all
sources, would be capped and reduced. But the uncapped
pollutants, and the smaller uncapped sources of capped
pollutants, may simply not be important enough to justify
a federal control effort.12
Such pollutants and sources would remain subject to
state controls. Indeed, since many of them would have local
effects, and since state and local governments will probably
be much more familiar with these effects and sources than
the federal government, states could well have a comparative advantage in addressing them.
Beyond that, Congress if it wished, could readily craft
"backstop" provisions to allow EPA to regulate uncapped
pollutants and sources, but only upon a showing that they
were creating real problems. For example, Congress could
authorize EPA to adopt additional controls, or require
states to adopt them, on a showing that air quality levels
exceeded set levels and were likely to continue to exceed
them. That approach would avoid the automatic cycles of
regulation that current law generates.
An alternative, more creative solution would harness the
power of information disclosure to prod states to act. EPA
could be charged with systematically developing and publicizing data on air quality, including any air quality problems caused by uncapped pollutants and sources. States
and their citizens could then draw on that information to
decide where additional regulation was necessary.

B.

"Hot Spot"Areas Where Air Quality Remains
Bad Despite the National Program

Programs of generic emission reduction often generate con-

cern that some areas will become "hot spots" that do not
enjoy the benefits of the broad national emission reduction
program. There is no real evidence that past cap-and-trade
programs have generated such hot spots. 13 And if the prospect is still worrisome, once again, it would be easy to craft
backstop authority, or an information disclosure program
to spur states to act.

12. The national control program would almost certainly target sulfur oxides
(a precursor of PM 2 ), nitrogen oxides (an ozone and PM 2 precursor), and
perhaps volatile organic compounds (VOCs) (an ozone precursor). The re-

maining NAAQS pollutants are carbon monoxide and lead. Existing control programs have already reduced emissions of both pollutants largely to
insignificance. These control programs aim largely at mobile sources. Our
suggestions would not affect mobile source control programs.
13. See69 Fed. Reg. 4566, 4629-30 (Jan. 30, 2004) (analyzing the effect of
EPA's Clean Air Interstate Rule).

VII. GHG Control
We both favor enactment of comprehensive GHG controls.
Our suggested CAA reforms would be fully consistent
with such a program. Indeed, enactment of GHG controls
would greatly strengthen our case for CAA reform.14
Even taken alone, CAA reform would reduce GHG
emissions, since setting a cap on conventional pollutant
emissions-which come largely from electric-generating
units-would favor the replacement of high-emitting generators with renewable energy, nuclear energy, and con-

14.

servation. It would make sense to design CAA reform to
capture as many of these reductions as possible.
With this small caveat, our suggested CAA controls
would work just as well without an accompanying GHG
reduction program as with one.
Of course, success in actually adopting CAA amendments might depend on adopting GHG controls as well.
This Article suggests that even those not convinced of the
need for GHG controls might find that price worth paying
to achieve the benefits of CAA reform.

For a detailed argument, see William E Pedersen, Adapting Environmental
Law to Global Warming Controls, 17 NYU ENVT'L L.J. 256 (2008).
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